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I. INTRODUCTION
Academic freedom constitutes the core of a university. In its most
basic form, academic freedom gives a university professor the right to
teach free of censorship and meddling by the university administra-
tion and other faculty members.' Although this basic concept seems
* Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Counsel-Northern Region. J.D., Florida State
University College of Law, 1998.. The author would like to thank Professor Steven G. Gey
for his invaluable insight and advice from the inception of this Comment to its completion.
The author would also like to thank Larry L. Fugate, whose assistance is a necessity in
every endeavor.
1. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 594 (1970)); see also William Van A1-
styne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, in
THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59, 71 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 1975). Professor Van
Alstyne defined academic freedom as follows:
"[Alcademic freedom" is characterized by a personal liberty to pursue the inves-
tigation, research, teaching, and publication of any subject as a matter of pro-
fessional interest without vocational jeopardy or threat of other sanction, save
only upon adequate demonstration of an inexcusable breach of professional
ethics in the exercise of that freedom. Specifically, that which sets academic
freedom apart as a distinct freedom is its vocational claim of special and lim-
ited accountability in respect to all academically related pursuits of the
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to hold near universal acceptance,2 the United States Supreme Court
has developed a line of cases in the past few years that pose a threat
to this liberty.3
In 1968 the Court recognized the free speech rights of public em-
ployees. 4 In subsequent years, the Court developed and refined the
level of protection public employees' speech receives under the First
Amendment.5 The Court, however, did not address whether this lim-
ited standard applied to academic free speech in public universities.
Recently, the restrictive public employee doctrine has clashed with
the virtues of academic freedom, with the loser being the academic
community.
This Comment analyzes the academic freedom rights, or lack
thereof, enjoyed by professors at public institutions. Part II reviews
the historical background and development of academic freedom.
Part III describes the synthesis of the public employee free speech
doctrine by the U.S. Supreme Court, and Part IV applies the doctrine
to the academic context. Part V examines the Supreme Court's recent
alteration and limitation of the public employee speech doctrine, and
Part VI analyzes the possible implications the restriction of the doc-
trine could have on academia. Finally, Part VII discusses the impor-
tance of academic freedom and proposes a standard for professorial
speech that recognizes and protects academic freedom.
II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM DEFINED
The roots of academic freedom derive from two distinct but com-
plimentary sources. One definition of academic freedom is based
upon a professional model promulgated by the American Association
of University Professors (AAUP) and has become the standard creed
teacher-scholar: an accountability not to any institutional or societal standard
of economic benefit, acceptable interest, right thinking, or socially constructive
theory, but solely to a fiduciary standard of professional integrity. To condition
the employment or personal freedom of the teacher-scholar upon the institu-
tional or societal approval of his academic investigations or utterances, or to
qualify either even by the immediate impact of his professional endeavors upon
the economic well-being or good will of the very institution that employs him, is
to abridge his academic freedom.
Id.
2. See Irwin H. Polishook, Academic Freedom and Academic Contexts, 15 PACE L.
REV. 141, 146-47 (1994) (noting that academic freedom is recognized in faculty manuals at
universities and incorporated in union contracts for academic faculty throughout the coun-
try).
3. See infra Parts IV-V.
4. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (stating that public
school teachers do not lose their free speech rights merely because they are government
employees).
5. See infra Part III.B.
[Vol. 26:187
ACADEMIC FREE SPEECH
in academia.' The U.S. Supreme Court developed a second, constitu-
tional definition 7 recognizing academic freedom as a "special concern"
of the First Amendment.8
A. The Professional Definition
In the late 1800s, professors were often fired for something they
wrote or said.9 This trend of punishing professors for their opinions
prompted the AAUP to form a committee to "bring the institutional
status of academic professionals up to the level their scholarly re-
nown had earned."'" Thus, in the 1915 General Declaration of Princi-
ples (1915 Declaration), the AAUP established the first comprehen-
sive definition of academic freedom in America." The thrust of the
1915 Declaration was that academic freedom is essential to the suc-
cess of post-secondary education."
The 1915 Declaration relied on the German concept of academic
freedom for guidance. 3 The German ideal of academic freedom en-
compassed three principles: Lehrfreiheit, Lernfreiheit, and Freiheit
der Wissenschaft.14 Lehrfreiheit embraced the notion of "teaching
freedom" and allowed professors to determine the content of their
lectures and to publish the results of their research without prior ap-
proval.'5 In contrast, Lernfreiheit meant "learning freedom" and ob-
viated any control a university had over a student's course of study. 6
Finally, Freiheit der Wissenschaft permitted academic self-
governance and allowed the university control of its internal affairs,
which was claimed an essential protection to freedom of teaching and
research.' 7 Concentrating on Lehrfreiheit, or the freedom to teach,
6. See Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic
Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1266 (1988).
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding unconstitutional
the university's requirement that faculty members certify that they were not members of
the Communist Party and recognizing a commitment to protect academic freedom).
9. See Metzger, supra note 6, at 1268 (stating that "the Darwinian controversies of
the 1870s and 1880s and the populist [turmoil] of the 1890s" fueled this situation).
10. Id.
11. See id. at 1267 (citing AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, THE
1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, A
HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 155 (Louis
Joughin ed., 1967) (1915)).
12. See Metzger, supro note 6, at 1272.
13. See id. at 1269. According to Metzger, thousands of American college graduates
moved to Germany for graduate education, and elated by their achievements in Germany,
they wished to bring the German concept of academic freedom back to the states. See id.
14, See id.
15. See id. Lehrfreiheit "protected the restiveness of academic intellect from the obe-
dience norms of hierarchy." Id.
16. See id. at 1270.
17. See id. at 1270-71.
1998]
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the committee wrote Lernfreiheit and Freiheit der Wissenschaft out of
its 1915 Declaration.18
By focusing on Lehrfreiheit, the committee emphasized its com-
mitment to the principle that professors should be able to teach and
publish without fear of or interference from the administration, thus
furthering a university's mission to "advance the sum of human
knowledge."'" A university also provides "general instruction for stu-
dents;" therefore, professors cannot properly perform their educa-
tional functions when they do not express themselves "fully or
frankly" or when students perceive professors as a "repressed and in-
timidated class."2 Finally, the committee noted that universities cul-
tivate "experts for public service;" thus, professors "must enjoy . . .
complete confidence in the disinterestedness of [their] conclusions. '2'
The 1915 Declaration included one remarkable difference from the
German notion of Lehrfreiheit. Lehrfreiheit's protection only encom-
passed what professors were qualified, authorized, and trained to
do.2" The 1915 Declaration's umbrella of protection did not extend
merely to fields in which a professor was trained and qualified, but
also included protection for academic utterances that did not fall
within a professor's expertise.23 Therefore, the report "labeled as 'un-
desirable' any effort to debar academic scholars 'from giving expres-
sion to their judgments upon controversial subjects,' or to limit their
public comments 'to questions falling within their specialties,' or to
deprive them in general of 'the political rights vouchsafed to every
citizen.' 2 4
Throughout the 1915 Declaration, the committee indicated that
university administrators posed the most serious threat to academic
freedom.2' The 1915 Declaration emphasized that a true university
"should be an intellectual experiment station, where new ideas may
germinate and where their fruit, though still distasteful to the com-
munity as a whole, may be allowed to ripen until finally, perchance,
it may become a part of the accepted intellectual food of the nation or
of the world."26 The 1915 Declaration further stressed that a univer-
18. See id. at 1277.
19. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, THE 1915 DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES, reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, A HANDBOOK OF THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 163 (Louis Joughin ed., 1967) (1915)
[hereinafter 1915 DECLARATION].
20. Id. at 164.
21. Id. at 165.
22. See Metzger, supra note 6, at 1274.
23. See id. at 1275 ('Academic freedom, [the committee] declared, contains not two
but three components: not just freedom to teach and to inquire ... but also 'extramural
freedom .. "' (quoting 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 19, at 172)).
24. Id. (quoting 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 19, at 172).
25. See id. at 1278.
26. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 19, at 167-68.
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sity that deprived its faculty members of academic freedom was not a
university at all, but a proprietary institution existing "for the
propagation of specific doctrines prescribed by those who have fur-
nished its endowment" and as such should not receive public sup-
port.27 Accordingly, the AAUP recognized the academic rather than
the academy under a newly created "profession-centered" definition
of academic freedom. 28
The 1915 Declaration has withstood the test of time as the
benchmark of academic freedom. The definition has been codified
and recodified by the AAUP, endorsed by more than 100 professional
associations, and incorporated into the handbooks and bylaws of
many American colleges and universities. 9 Although the 1915 Decla-
ration is the paradigm of academic freedom in the United States, it is
an example of "soft law."3 Generally policed by the AAUP, the 1915
Declaration is not enforced by the courts. 3' Thus, the concept of aca-
demic freedom needed a basis in "hard law," such as the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.32
B. The Constitutional Definition
The courts originally viewed academic freedom as the "freedom to
do good and not to teach evil. '3 3 The concept did not receive serious
attention from the courts until the mid-1950s amidst a rash of gov-
ernment investigations of alleged communist conspiracies.3 4 Judicial
reaction to the government's efforts to purge allegedly insurgent
teachers positioned the academic freedom issue at the forefront of a
constitutional debate. 31
27. Id. at 159.
28. Metzger, supra note 6, at 1284.
29. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in
the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1990, at 79, 79 [hereinafter Van Alstyne, Historical Review]. The 1915
Declaration evolved into the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Ten-
ure (1940 Statement), which was sponsored by both the AAUP and the Association of
American Colleges (AAC). See William W. Van Alstyne, Forward, Freedom and Tenure in
the Academy: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1940 Statement of Principles, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 1, 1.
30. See Van Alstyne, Historical Review, supra note 29, at 79 (referring to the 1940
Statement).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Metzger, supra note 6, at 1285 (quoting Kay v. Board of Higher Educ., 18 N.Y.S.2d
821, 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940)) (explaining that Kay was the only case recognizing constitu-
tionally protected academic freedom prior to the late 1940s).
34. See David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional"
Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990,
at 227, 235.
35. See Metzger, supra note 6, at 1285.
1998]
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The Supreme Court's recognition that the First Amendment spe-
cifically protects academic freedom36 is significant because it would
not have been difficult for the Court to reject this notion. 7 The First
Amendment is perceived to afford equal protection to all citizens.3 8
For example, the First Amendment specifically mentions special pro-
tection of the press; however, this protection has been interpreted as
granting no extraordinary rights over those enjoyed by other citi-
zens.3 9 Nonetheless, constitutionalizing academic freedom necessi-
tated creating a First Amendment right unique to professors.
1. Beginning of a Constitutional Definition
The term "academic freedom" first appeared in Supreme Court ju-
risprudence in Adler v. Board of Education.40 In Adler, the Supreme
Court examined the constitutionality of New York's Feinberg Law, a
sedition law that promoted the removal of any public employee who
belonged to an organization that advocated the overthrow of the gov-
ernment by forceful, violent, or illegal means. 4' Although the major-
ity concluded that the statute did not violate the First Amendment
rights of the teachers,42 Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion,
conceived a theory of academic freedom that was later to be accepted
by a majority of the Court. 43 What is most notable about Justice
Douglas' dissent is not that academic freedom is mentioned for the
first time but, rather, that it is identified as a subset of the First
Amendment.4 4 Justice Douglas stated that "[t]he Constitution guar-
antees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our society..
None needs it more than the teacher.
45
36. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("Our Nation is
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all
of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. . . . 'The vigilant protection of constitu-
tional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."'
(quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479. 487 (1960))).
37. See Rabban, supra note 34, at 238.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. 342 U.S. 485 (1952), overruled by Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967).
41. See id. at 490.
42. See id. at 493.
43. See id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. See Van Alstyne, Historical Review, supra note 29, at 107.
45. Adler, 342 U.S. at 508 (Douglas, J. dissenting). Justice Douglas stressed the result
the Feinberg Law would have on academic freedom:
What happens under this law is typical of what happens in a police state.
Teachers are under constant surveillance; their pasts are combed for signs of
disloyalty; their utterances are watched for clues to dangerous thoughts. A pall
is cast over the classrooms. There can be no real academic freedom in that en-
vironment.
Id. at 510.
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The same year the Court decided Adler, it held unconstitutional
an Oklahoma statute requiring public employees to take a loyalty
oath that they had not associated with specific organizations. 6 This
case arose when faculty and staff members of the Oklahoma Agricul-
tural and Mechanical College refused to subscribe to the required
oath.47 The Court distinguished Adler by claiming that, unlike the
Feinberg Law, the statute in question excluded persons from state
employment based solely on membership in an organization, regard-
less of any knowledge of the organization's purpose. 48 In his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Frankfurter stated that teachers "must have the
freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the
meaning of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of
social and economic dogma. '49 Thus, academic freedom emerged into
Supreme Court jurisprudence through dissenting and concurring
opinions but had yet to win acceptance by a majority of the Court.
2. Majority Approval
A majority of the Court recognized the virtues of academic free-
dom in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.0 This case arose when the New
Hampshire attorney general, acting pursuant to his authority to in-
vestigate subversive activities, subpoenaed Sweezy, a college profes-
sor, to answer questions about his lectures.5' Sweezy refused to an-
swer certain questions and was convicted of contempt.52
Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Warren concluded that the
Attorney General's directive violated Sweezy's right to academic
freedom and political expression.53 The Court explained in an oft-
quoted paragraph:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American univer-
sities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital
role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train
our youth. To impose any straight jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of
our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended
by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is
that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmos-
46. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
47. See id. at 185.
48. See id. at 191.
49. Id. at 196 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
50. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
51. See id. at 236-38.
52. See id. at 238. Questions included inquiry as to whether Sweezy advocated Marx-
ism, whether he indicated that socialism was an inevitability in the United States, and
whether he ever "espoused the theory of dialectical materialism." Id. at 244.
53. See id. at 250.
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phere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must al-
ways remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stag-
nate and die.54
Sweezy is not regarded as an academic freedom case per se be-
cause it was ultimately decided on narrower grounds and the lan-
guage emphasizing the importance of protecting academic freedom
was stated in dicta. Nonetheless, a majority of the Court shared the
opinion that academic freedom was essential to American society.15
Yet, it would be another ten years before the Court specifically
linked academic freedom to the First Amendment.
In 1967 the Court decided Keyishian v. Board of Regents56 and de-
clared that academic freedom is a "special concern of the First
Amendment.""1 Keyishian involved the Feinberg Law upheld in Ad-
ler, which required state university faculty members to sign an affi-
davit stating that they were not communists.5 The Court held that
the law was unconstitutionally vague. 59 Announcing its commitment
to academic freedom, the Court wrote, "Our nation is deeply com-
mitted to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent
value to all of us and not merely to teachers concerned. ' '60
Keyishian is important because a majority of the Court explicitly
recognized academic freedom as a special subset of the First
Amendment. Furthermore, the language in both Sweezy and Keyi-
shian emphasized the importance of critical inquiry in universities,
not just for teachers, but for society as a whole. Thus, academic free-
dom traveled a long way from its inception in the courts as the "free-
dom to do good and not to teach evil." 1
Nevertheless, in a line of recent cases, the Supreme Court se-
verely restricted the free speech rights of public employees, including
teachers. Such restrictions question the Court's commitment to an
academic freedom it described as "of transcendent value to all of
us."62 The Supreme Court has not specifically retreated from its
54. Id.
55. See id. Justice Frankfurter wrote: "A university is characterized by the spirit of
free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates---to follow the argument where it leads.'..
• It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation." Id. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting
Conference of Representatives of the Univ. of Cape Town and the Univ. of Witwatersrand,
THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES OF SOUTH AFRICA 10-12 (1957)).
56. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
57. Id. at 603.
58. See id. at 592.
59. See id. at 609.
60. Id. at 603 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
61. Metzger, supra note 6, at 1285 (quoting Kay v. Board of Higher Educ., 18 N.Y.S.2d
821, 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940)).
62. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
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commitment to protecting academic freedom as a special concern of
the First Amendment; however, academic freedom cases must now be
viewed in light of the Court's general aversion towards public em-
ployee free speech.
III. THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DOCTRINE
Public employees traditionally had no First Amendment free
speech rights. 3 The famous pronouncement of former Massachusetts
Supreme Court Justice Holmes' regarding a policeman's free speech
rights summed up the courts' stance on such issues: "[He] may have
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman.."64 The Supreme Court retreated from this
broad position in 1968, recognizing that public employees' speech de-
serves some protection under the First Amendment.6 5
A. A Balancing Approach
In Pickering v. Board of Education," the Supreme Court, for the
first time, held that public employees do not forsake their First
Amendment rights simply because the government is their employer.
This landmark case involved the free speech rights of public employ-
ees and concerned a public high school teacher who wrote a letter
that was published in the local newspaper criticizing the school
board's handling of funds.6 7 The school board determined that the let-
ter was disruptive to the school's operation and administration and
dismissed the teacher accordingly. 68 The Supreme Court held that
the dismissal violated Pickering's free speech rights.69 The Court em-
phasized that when the government acts as an employer regulating
the speech of its employees, its interest differs greatly from when it
seeks to regulate the speech of its citizens as a sovereign. 70 Thus, a
court must balance the interests of the employee as a citizen in
speaking on matters of public concern with the interest of the gov-
ernment in the efficient operation of the public services it performs.71
63. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Historical Review, supra note 29, at 83 (explaining that
employers were not constitutionally restricted from requiring, as a condition of employ-
ment, an employee to suspend his freedom of speech, as long as the employee had notice of
the condition prior to accepting employment).
64. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892) (noting that
although a public employee may be expected to temper his speech, the courts might inter-
vene if the restrictions are extremely unreasonable).
65. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
66. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
67. See id. at 564.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 574 (holding that a teacher may not be dismissed from public employ-
ment for exercising his right to speak on public issues).
70. See id. at 568.
71. See id.
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However, the Court was not required to "balance" these respective
interests in this case because it found that Pickering's comments did
not have an effect on the efficient operation of the school district.
72
The Court noted some factors that should be considered in bal-
ancing a public employee's free speech rights against the govern-
ment's interest in the efficient operation of its services: whether the
speech interfered with a supervisor's ability to maintain discipline or
harmony among co-workers; the level of disruption caused by the
disputed behavior; and the type of relationship between the em-
ployee, the school board, and the superintendent. 73 However, the
Court did not identify what interests a public employee, much less a
teacher, would have in commenting on matters of public concern, nor
did it outline the parameters of public concern.
In applying a public employee free speech balancing approach to
professors, the Court did not discuss academic freedom. The Court
stated that teachers may not "be compelled to relinquish the First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to com-
ment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of
the public schools in which they work. 74 Pickering did not address if
and how to apply academic freedom in such a context. Accordingly,
the vigilant protection of academic freedom as a special concern of
the First Amendment went largely unrealized.
B. Synthesis of the Pickering Standard
In the years following Pickering, the Court further refined the
standard that applied to public employee free speech cases. The re-
sult was a restrictive, yet clear, test that acknowledged a very lim-
ited First Amendment right to public employee free speech.
1. Protected Speech, Causation, and Burden of Proof
Mount Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle7 clarified and added
to the standard adopted in Pickering. In Mount Healthy, an unten-
ured teacher was discharged after he telephoned a local radio station
and revealed the substance of a memorandum linking teacher ap-
pearance and dress to public support for school bond issues.76 The
Court determined that the speech deserved First Amendment protec-
tion without first deciding whether that speech regarded a matter of
public concern.77 In the Court's view, the dispositive factor was
72. See id. at 571-73.
73. See id. at 568-70.
74. Id. at 568.
75. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
76. See id. at 282.
77. See id. at 283-84.
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whether the telephone call was a substantial or motivating factor in
the teacher's dismissal.7 8
The Court vacated the lower court decision and remanded to es-
tablish whether the school board could prove that it would have
reached the same decision regarding Doyle's reinstatement absent
the protected conduct 79 The .Court expressed concern that an em-
ployer should not be hindered in evaluating employee performance
records simply because the employer's decision is reinforced by the
protected conduct.8 0 Thus, the Court clarified the Pickering test by
placing the initial burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that his
conduct is constitutionally protected." The Court added to Pickering
by requiring that if the plaintiff can show his speech is protected, he
must prove the protected speech was a substantial or motivating fac-
tor underlying the adverse action. 2 Finally, if the plaintiff can meet
this burden, the defendant must be given the opportunity to show
that, although the conduct may have influenced the decision, the de-
fendant would have reached the same conclusion, even in the ab-
sence of the protected conduct.83
2. Forum Impact on the Pickering Test
In Giuhan v. Consolidated School District,4 the Court addressed
whether the Pickering balancing test applies to public employees
when they speak in private contexts. 5 Givhan, a junior high school
teacher, was dismissed because she expressed her concerns about
school employment policies that she considered racially discrimina-
tory in a private meeting with the school principal. 6 The Supreme
Court found in favor of the teacher and rejected the notion that
comments made by a public employee in a private context were not
protected by the First Amendment. 7
In previous public employee free speech cases, the public employ-
ees spoke through public channels.8 Givhan was the first case in
which the Court was asked to address whether the same test applied
to a public employee speaking through private channels. The Court
stated that "[w]hile those cases each arose in the context of a public
78. See id. at 287.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 286.
81. See id. at 287.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 286-87.
84. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
85. Seeid. at 415.
86. See id. at 411-12.
87. See id. at 414-16.
88. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (involving a letter pub-
lished in a local newspaper).
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employee's public expression, the rule to be derived from them is not
dependent on that largely coincidental fact." 9 Givhan's contribution
to the public employee doctrine is that the doctrine does not hinge on
the forum in which the employee chooses to speak, but that the First
Amendment protects public employees who choose to communicate
their views privately rather than publicly.90
3. Public Concern as a Threshold Matter and the Potential for
Disruption
Connick v. Myers"' was the first major public employee free speech
case that did not involve a public school teacher. Although Connick
severely restricts the public employee free speech doctrine, many
courts cite Connick when explaining the application of the Pickering
balancing test, even in the public education context.2
The issue presented in Connick was whether Pickering protects a
public employee from being discharged for speech concerning inter-
nal office affairs.93 Myers, an assistant district attorney, was sched-
uled for a transfer to a different section of the criminal court.9 4 Myers
expressed her opposition to the transfer to many of her supervisors
and circulated a questionnaire concerning the office transfer policy
and other office policies. 5
The Court established that as a threshold matter, public employee
speech must be of a public concern, or relate to any political, social,
or community concern to qualify for First Amendment protection.96 If
Myers' speech was not on a matter of public concern, then it was not
protected and the Court need not inquire as to the reason for her dis-
charge .97
The Court further explained that courts must look to the form,
content, and context of a statement to determine whether the speech
addresses matters of public concern or personal interest.98 Taking
these criteria into account, the Court concluded that all but one of
the questions on Myers' questionnaire related to internal office mat-
ters. The Court noted that speech of a personal concern or a mere
grievance did not implicate the First Amendment."'
89. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414.
90. See id.
91. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
92. See Donna Prokop, Controversial Teacher Speech: Striking a Balance Between
First Amendment Rights and Educational Interests, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2533, 2542 (1993).
93. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 140-41.
96. See id. at 146.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 147-48.
99. See id. at 149.
100. See id.
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The Court applied the Pickering balancing test to the portion of
the questionnaire it found related to a matter of public concern.' 0'
The Court weighed Myers' interest in her speech against the state's
interest in preventing potentially disruptive speech. 0 The Court
concluded that the state's interest outweighed Myers' interest in her
speech because her speech threatened to interfere with the efficient
operation of the workplace.1 3 The Court stated that "[tihe limited
First Amendment interest involved here does not require that Con-
nick [Myers' supervisor] tolerate action which he reasonably believed
would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close
working relationships."'0
4
Connick restricts the Pickering balancing test in two important
ways. First, the Court stated that, as a threshold matter, the speech
in question must be on a matter of public concern.' 0' If the speech is
not on a matter of public concern, a court is not required to balance
the competing interests." 6 Second, the Court must balance the inter-
est a public employee has in his speech against the employer's inter-
est in preventing actual or potential disruption of the workplace. 0 7
The Court has not directly addressed the issue of potential disruption
in the context of public school teachers. However, "[aifter Connick, it
seemed unlikely that a public employee could prevail on a First
Amendment speech claim."'0 8
4. A Brief Respite from the Potential for Disruption
In Rankin v. McPherson,0 9 the Court seemed to hedge its position
in Connick that potential disruption was sufficient to outweigh a
public employee's free speech interest. Rankin arose after a data en-
try clerk, McPherson, heard about an attempt on the President's life
and remarked, "[If they go for him again, I hope they get him."10
101. See id. at 150-54. The question the Court found related to a matter of public con-
cern was whether the attorneys in the office "ever feel pressured to work in political cam-
paigns on behalf of office supported candidates." Id. at 149.
102. See id. at 152 ("[WMe do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to
unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working rela-
tionships is manifest before taking action.").
103. See id. at 150-54.
104. Id. at 154.
105. See id. at 146.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 152 (cautioning that "a stronger showing [by the employer] may be nec-
essary if the employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public concern").
108. Richard H. Hiers, New Restrictions on Academic Free Speech: Jefiries v. Harleston
II, 22 J.C. & U.L. 217, 240 (1995).
109. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
110. Id. at 380-81.
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The remark was overheard and reported to McPherson's supervisor,
who subsequently fired her."'
After finding that McPherson's speech addressed a matter of pub-
lic concern, the Court found no evidence that her remarks actually
interfered with or disrupted the workplace.' 2 The Court held that
the employer's interest in firing McPherson did not exceed McPher-
son's First Amendment rights." 3 In contrast to Connick, Rankin ap-
pears to require a showing of actual disruption to agency operations
rather than abstract showings of threatened disruption to discipline,
authority, or working relationships."'4
IV. APPLYING THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DOCTRINE TO THE
ACADEMIC CONTEXT
From Pickering and its progeny, the Supreme Court synthesized a
clear test for lower courts to apply to public employee free speech
cases. First, a court must determine if an employee's speech relates
to a matter of public concern."' If it does, a court must then balance
the interests of the employee, as a citizen speaking on matters of
public concern, with the interest of the government, as an employer
efficiently performing public services through its employees." 6 Fi-
nally, a court must determine whether the protected speech was a
substantial or motivating factor underlying the adverse employment
action." 7 If the protected speech was a motivating or substantial fac-
tor, the government employer is given the opportunity to show that,
absent the protected conduct, the employer would have reached the
same decision." 8
A professor is not a typical public employee, however, and the syn-
thesized public employee doctrine is complicated as applied to profes-
sors at institutions of higher learning. Thus, lower courts have expe-
rienced difficulty determining how the test should apply and have
differed with respect to the role academic freedom should play in
balancing competing interests.
A. Out-of-Class Speech
Courts apply the Pickering balancing test when determining the
free speech rights of professors outside of the classroom." 9 In Picker-
111. See id. at 381-82.
112. See id. at 388-89.
113. See id. at 392.
114. See Hiers, supra note 108, at 241-42.
115. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983).
116. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
117. See Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
118. See id. at 287.
119. This test includes Pickering and the subsequent decisions that modified and lim-
ited the test. See supra Part III.
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ing, the Court stated that courts must "arrive at a balance between
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees." ' Courts from various jurisdictions have generally found
that Pickering and its progeny provide the appropriate test for de-
termining whether a professor's speech outside of the classroom is
protected.' 2' What is not entirely clear from such cases is how to ap-
ply the test and what weight to give to the role of a professor in the
balancing of interests.
Some jurisdictions recognize the special role of professors and the
virtues of academic freedom by altering the balancing test from the
beginning to require the government to show substantial disruption
before it may suppress speech in academic contexts.' In Burnham v.
Ianni,'23 university officials removed several photographic portraits
of professors from a history department display case after receiving a
complaint from a professor that the display was "insensitive" and
"inappropriate" and constituted sexual harassment.'2 4
The Eighth Circuit found the university's reliance on Pickering
misplaced because there was "no factual showing that the suppressed
conduct 'substantially' interfered with the efficiency of the workplace
or [the university's] educational mission."'25 The court stated that
"[t]he government employer must make a substantial showing that
the speech is, in fact, disruptive before the speech may be pun-
ished."' 26 The Burnham court noted that its holding recognized a pro-
fessor's academic freedom.'2 7 The Burnham decision substantially
120. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
121. See, e.g., Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 668, 677-80 (8th Cir. 1997).
122. See, e.g., id. (requiring a showing of disruption). But see Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911
F. Supp. 999, 1016 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 106 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2482 (1997) (stating that potential or threatened disruption is sufficient).
123. 119 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 1997).
124. See id. at 670-72. The university history club placed the pictures in the display
case in an effort to publicize the areas of expertise and interest of some of the history de-
partment faculty. See id. at 670-71. The professors who participated in the project posed
for pictures with props relating to their fields of interest, supplied information about their
fields, academic background, historical heroes, and provided quotations for display with
the photographs. See id.
125. Id. at 679; accord Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d 289, 294 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating
that "it is critical to determine whether the [employers] have put the Pickering balancing
test at issue by producing evidence that the speech activity had an adverse effect on the ef-
ficiency of the ... employer's operations").
126. Burnham, 119 F.3d at 680. The court stated that "undifferentiated fear or appre-
hension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Id. at
679 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
127. See id. at 680 n. 19. The court stated that underlying its decision was "the recogni-
tion of the professors' academic freedom---'a special concern of the First Amendment."' Id.
(quoting University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).
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protects academic freedom by requiring an initial showing of disrup-
tion before the balancing test ever comes into play.' 28
Other jurisdictions have also required the government to show
substantial disruption before it may suppress speech in academic
contexts. The Third Circuit has held that in an academic setting, the
government cannot impose restrictions on speech unless the speech
would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirement
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."'2 9 Likewise,
the Ninth Circuit has concluded that in academic environments, the
government may only regulate protected speech when it "involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. '3 °
However, not all jurisdictions agree that academic freedom plays
a special role in the Pickering balancing test. In Westbrook v. Teton
County School District,"' a special education teacher was disciplined
pursuant to a staff conduct policy limiting and restricting criticism
against the school district. 32 The United States District Court for the
District of Wyoming held that the policy was vague and overbroad.133
However, the court also found that the First Amendment did not af-
ford heightened protection to academic speech."14 Thus, the court
stated:
Although educators may choose to restrict speech in the schools
without violating the letter of the First Amendment, they violate
the spirit of the First Amendment when they do so .... [T]his...
does not lead to a holding that Westbrook's speech is protected be-
cause she may have been speaking about school matters in an aca-
demic setting. 135
Such factors, the court explained, are adequately considered in the
traditional Pickering balancing test."16
Likewise, in Rubin v. Ikenberry, 1 7 the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois found that "[a]cademic free-
dom is not an independent First Amendment right.""18 While ac-
128. See id. at 679.
129. Trotman v, Board of Trustees, 635 F.2d 216, 230 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)). Trotman arose after a
dispute between the university faculty and the administration regarding the administra.
tion's suppression of the faculty's criticism of university policy. See id. at 219.
130. Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that when a uni-
versity's regulation threatened a professor's First Amendment right to free speech because
of the regulation's vagueness, the court must require specificity before attempting to rule
on its validity).
131. 918 F. Supp. 1475 (DJ. Wyo. 1996).
132. See id. at 1480-81.
133. See id. at 1489.
134. See id. at 1491.
135. Id. at 1493.
136. See id.
137. 933 F. Supp. 1425 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
138. Id. at 1433.
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knowledging that a teacher's academic freedom receives some protec-
tion, the court stressed that academic freedom also applies to univer-
sity administrators.' 39 Emphasizing that these two freedoms can con-
flict, the court stated, "[a]cademic freedom does not license uncon-
trolled expression .... Accordingly, the court did not accord the
professor's academic freedom concerns any greater weight.' 4'
It is not clear from an analysis of these cases whether academic
freedom alters the Pickering balancing test. The Court has never ar-
ticulated whether a professor's interest in academic freedom should
be accorded greater weight than an average public employee's inter-
est in speech in the balancing process.
B. Classroom Speech
Lower courts have not developed a consistent test to be applied to
a professor's speech in the classroom because the Supreme Court has
not addressed the level of protection that such speech demands. 42 As
a result, courts have been reluctant to develop a definite standard
applicable to academic speech in the classroom.4 1 When courts have
fashioned a test, however, the approaches have been varied, and
none of the standards have adequately factored academic freedom
and the special role of a professor.
Most courts sought guidance from Supreme Court cases that dis-
cussed the First Amendment rights of students in the classroom'"
For example, in Miles v. Denver Public Schools, 45 the Tenth Circuit
extended the Supreme Court's holding in Hazelwood School District
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1444. The court did not balance the interest of the professor against that
of the university because the court found that the professor's speech was not on a matter of
public concern. See id.
142. See generally Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, Beeman v. Cohen, 117 S. Ct. 1290 (1997) (recognizing that neither the
Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court have defined the extent of First Amendment protec-
tion enjoyed by professors regarding in-class speech); Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp.
999 (W.D. Va. 1996), affd, 106 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997)
(applying the Pickering balancing test to determine the scope of protection given to profes-
sors' speech).
143. See Cohen, 92 F.3d at 971-72 (declining to define the parameters of First Amend-
ment protection afforded classroom speech because the college's policy threatening to deter
Cohen's right to free speech was unconstitutionally vague); see also Rubin v. Ikenberry,
933 F. Supp. 1425, 1442 (C.D. Ill. 1996) ("The Court does not aim to suggest guidelines for
the relationship between a professor's classroom conduct and a university's response.").
144. See generally Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993). (failure to rehire a
teacher because of in-class statements); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir.
1991) (discipline for teacher's in-class speech); Zykan v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp.,
631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980) (students' speech); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d
Cir. 1972) (teacher discharged for wearing a black armband in class).
145. 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
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v. Kuhlmeier146 concerning the students' free speech rights in the
classroom to the classroom speech of a ninth grade teacher.1 4 7 Thus,
the Miles court stated that school officials may restrict a teacher's in-
class speech if there is a legitimate pedagogical interest in abridging
the speech and the restriction is reasonably related to that inter-
est. 1
48
At first glance, it may seem odd that courts would apply cases
dealing with student speech to teacher speech. However, absent
guidance from the Supreme Court, many lower federal courts found
that such cases were the only cases upon which they could rely.
Thus, many other lower courts have analogized teacher classroom
speech cases to Hazelwood and adopted the same test as did the
Miles court. 149
The Eleventh Circuit appears to have developed an independent
test for a professor's classroom speech. In Bishop v. Aronov, 50 the
court developed its own standard based upon its reading of Hazel-
wood. The court first considered the context of this speech, noting
that a professor's speech inherently possesses a coercive effect upon
students, which the university may wish to avoid.' The court then
considered the university's position as an employer that reasonably
controls the curriculum and the content communicated in class."12
Finally, the court weighed the professor's interest in academic free-
dom.1
5 3
After applying this balancing test, the court concluded that the
university's speech restrictions on Dr. Bishop were reasonable in
light of the university's interest in its professors' classroom con-
146. 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that schools can place restrictions on speech if the
restrictions are "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns").
147. See Miles, 944 F.2d at 775 (requiring a court to first ask whether the forum for
speech is public in determining whether the speech is protected by the First Amendment).
During class, Miles stated that the quality of the school had declined. See id. at 774. In re-
sponse to a student's request for examples of this decline, Miles stated, "I don't think in
1967 you would have seen two students making out on the tennis court." Id. He also said
there would not have been as many soda cans lying around. See id.
148. See id. at 775. The court declined to use the Pickering balancing test because the
test did not take into account the interests of the state as an educator. See id. at 777. It is
interesting to note that the standard the Tenth Circuit adopted may actually be more pro-
tective of speech because the court must weigh several factors, including the age and so-
phistication of the students and the educational objective. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). In this way, classroom speech of college professors
would probably be given more protection than the ninth grade teacher in Miles. Further-
more, unlike teachers at the elementary, junior, and high school levels, college professors
are not faced with the task of inculcating values.
149. See, e.g., Prokop, supra note 92, at 2538-40.
150. 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991). In Bishop, a university required a professor to
stop discussing his religious beliefs during instructional time periods. See id. at 1069.
151. See id. at 1074.
152. See id. (noting that classroom speech could appear as if the university endorsed
the speech).
153. See id. at 1075.
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duct. 54 This standard is even more restrictive of free speech rights
than the one developed by Hazelwood.5 5 Under the Bishop test, the
university does not have to show a pedagogical interest. As long as a
regulation is reasonable, the court will defer to the judgment of
school officials. 56 The implications of the decision may be limited,
however, because Bishop was complicated by Establishment Clause
issues. 57
While not developing an independent test for classroom speech as
did Bishop, one federal court applied the Pickering balancing test to
a professor's classroom speech. In Scallet v. Rosenblum,5 8 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia stated, "In
the absence of clear guidance, this court will apply the Pickering bal-
ancing test to determine the level of first amendment protection af-
forded Scallet's in-class speech."1 59 It appears that the court opted to
use Pickering in an attempt to give more protection to professors'
classroom speech. The court noted that the cases adopting Hazelwood
have addressed the in-class speech of secondary school teachers and
not the classroom speech of professors at the university or graduate
level. 10 The court also recognized that secondary schools might have
more of an interest in restricting classroom speech than would a uni-
versity because secondary schools play a paternalistic role by pro-
tecting students from exposure to material that may be inappropri-
ate for their respective ages.'6 '
The Scallet court expressed its reservations about applying Pick-
ering to the classroom speech of university professors because the
"test does not explicitly account for the robust tradition of academic
freedom .... ,,16" However, the court concluded that such concerns
could be accounted for by identifying the teacher's interest in the
speech within the test's parameters. 63
154. See id. at 1076.
155. The Bishop court stated:
While a student's expression can be more readily identified as a thing inde-
pendent of the school, a teacher's speech can be taken as directly and deliber-
ately representative of the school. Hence, where the in-class speech of a teacher
is concerned, the school has an interest not only in preventing interference with
the day-to-day operation of its classrooms as in Tinker, but also in scrutinizing
expressions that "the public might reasonably perceive to bear [its] imprimatur
Id. at 1073 (citation omitted) (alterations in original).
156. See id. at 1075.
157. See id. at 1077; see also Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 n.13 (W.D.
Va. 1996), affd, 106 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) (declining
to rely on Bishop because the instant case did not confront Establishment Clause issues).
158. 911 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Va. 1996).
159. Id. at 1011.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See id.
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V. A DOCTRINE IN DISARRAY: WATERS V. CHURCHILL
Even though the public employee doctrine is complicated when
applied in the academic context, the synthesis of Pickering and its
progeny established a workable doctrine for lower courts. In Waters
v. Churchill,'64 however, the Court further restricted its public em-
ployee free speech jurisprudence. While not overruling the Pickering
line of cases, the Court realigned the balancing analysis considerably
to favor the government employer, thus rendering public employee
free speech almost nonexistent.
In Waters, Churchill was fired from her nursing job for statements
she made to a co-worker that were overheard by third parties, the
contents of which were later disputed.'65 Churchill's employer con-
tended that the comments Churchill made were disruptive.1 6 How-
ever, according to Churchill, the conversation was limited to nondis-
ruptive statements about a hospital policy with which she did not
agree.' 67 Churchill filed suit for the violation of her First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights. 168
The United States District Court for Central Illinois granted
summary judgment to the hospital because Churchill's speech was
not on a matter of public concern, and the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that her speech was on a matter of public concern and was
protected under Connick.'6 The Seventh Circuit also stated that
Churchill's employer should have acted on what Churchill actually
said rather on what the hospital administration thought she said.170
In previous public employee cases, the Supreme Court was not
faced with a dispute over the substance of the speech. Therefore, Wa-
ters presented the Court with a problem that earlier public employee
free speech cases had not resolved: What happens when the govern-
ment employer is uncertain as to what an employee actually said?
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion began by stating that the
Connick standard clearly applied.' 7' The question, as the Court
framed it, was how to determine the factual basis for applying the
test.'72 The plurality focused on whether a public employee who had
been disciplined for her speech was entitled to a trial court determi-
nation of what was actually said, or whether she may be disciplined
164. 511U.S. 661 (1994).
165. See id. at 664-66.
166. See id. at 665-66.
167. See id. at 666. Others who overheard the conversation corroborated Churchill's
version of the facts. See id.
168. See id. at 667.
169. See Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1992).
170. See id. at 1127.
171. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994).
172. See id.
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for what the employer thought she said. 73 The Court concluded that
Churchill may be disciplined for what her employer thought she
said.'74
In so holding, the Court stated, "The government's interest in
achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated
from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a
significant one when it acts as an employer."'175 The Court stressed
that the Seventh Circuit's holding did not give the government's in-
terest in efficient employment decision making enough weight.7 7 The
Court explained that in applying the test to what the employer
thought was said, a court must consider the reasonableness of the
employer's conclusions. 17  An employer must act in good faith, but
good faith alone may not be sufficient. 78 The Court stated that man-
agers should exercise reasonable care in determining what speech is
protected, similar to the care a manager would employ when making
hiring decisions. 17 9 However, the Court did not set out what would or
would not be reasonable, or what procedural safeguards employers
must follow. 180 Therefore, the Court concluded that if Churchill's em-
ployer really fired her based on a reasonable belief that her conversa-
tion was unprotected, then the employer would prevail.' 8 ' Neverthe-
less, the Court stated that regardless of whether Churchill's version
of the speech was on a matter of public concern, which the Court said
it did not have to decide, "the potential disruptiveness of the speech
as reported was enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment
value it might have had."182
173. See id.
174. See id. at 676-77 ("Government employees should be allowed to use personnel pro-
cedures that differ from the evidentiary rules used by the court without fear that these dif-
ferences will lead to liability.").
175. Id. at 675.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 677.
178. See id. ("It is necessary that the decisionmaker reach its conclusion about what
was said in good faith, rather than as a pretext; but it does not follow that good faith is suf-
ficient.").
179. See id. at 677-78.
180. The Court indicated that it would be unreasonable for an employer to act on no
evidence at all, or for an employer to act on weak evidence when faced with strong evidence
to the contrary. See id. at 677. The Court implied that some investigation would be re-
quired on the part of the employer but did not elaborate on what procedural protections
would be sufficient. See id. at 677-78.
181. See id. at 679-80.
182. Id. at 680 (emphasis added). The Court noted that Churchill's statements "damp-
ened" another employee's interest in working in obstetrics. See id. Further, the Court
stated that Churchill's co-worker described Churchill's statements about her supervisor as
unkind and inappropriate and stated that the hospital should not tolerate such negative
attitudes. See id. Thus, the Court found that Churchill's statements could undermine her
supervisor's authority in her co-workers' eyes. See id. at 680-81. In addition, the Court con-
cluded that Churchill's statement that she could not "wipe the slate clean" could make the
hospital doubt Churchill's future effectiveness. Id. at 681.
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An interesting aspect of Waters is its narrow holding. Even though
the Court concluded that the hospital was justified in firing Waters
for her comments, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Cir-
cuit to determine whether Churchill had actually been fired because
of the statements at issue or because of something else. 18' Thus, the
Court did not even have to reach several of the issues it addressed.
Obviously, the Court intended to send a strong message regarding
public employee free speech cases: it will give great deference to an
employer's determination of whether speech is protected and to the
employer's prediction of harm.
Justice Souter concurred in the opinion but only to emphasize
that, while the reasonableness test set out by the plurality is the ap-
propriate test for lower courts to apply, an employer must also be-
lieve the results of its investigation. 18 4 Justice Scalia, also concurring,
agreed that Churchill's speech was not protected but complained that
the decision was not necessary to the disposition of the case.185 Jus-
tice Scalia remarked, "We will spend decades trying to improvise the
limits of this new First Amendment procedure that is unmentioned
in text and unformed by tradition.' 8 6
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun as the only dissent-
ers, believed the Court was not adequately protecting the free speech
rights of public employees. Justice Stevens wrote, "Every American
has the right to express an opinion on issues of public significance."' '87
In reasoning reminiscent of earlier public employee free speech cases,
Justice Stevens stressed that only unduly disruptive speech would be
possible grounds for discipline or termination. 18 Thus, according to
Justice Stevens, actual disruption would be required before a public
183. See id. at 681-82. It was not settled whether the Mount Healthy standard had
been met-that the speech was a motivating or substantial factor in the employment deci-
sion. See id.
184. See id. at 684-85 (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that an objectively reason-
able investigation that reveals the employee's speech was not on a matter of public concern
and was not disruptive would not shield the employer from liability absent the employer's
reasonable belief regarding what was said).
185. See id. at 689-92 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia found the reasonableness
standard confusing. He criticized the majority because it placed an unnecessary burden on
public employers to conduct some kind of investigation. See id. at 688. He also stated that
because the required procedure was not defined, employers were subjected to "intolerable
legal uncertainty." Id. at 692. Justice Scalia's approach would be less protective of speech
because he disagreed with the procedural requirements the Court imposed. See id. at 686-
89. Justice Scalia stated that a "pretext" analysis would be sufficient to protect the consti-
tutional interest at stake. See id. at 690. Under a pretext analysis, speech restrictions
would be upheld unless the restrictions were a pretext for preventing free speech, effec-
tively eliminating procedural requirements. See id. at 691.
186. Id. at 694.
187. Id. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. See id. at 695.
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employer could infringe upon the free speech rights of its employ-
ees.189
In one fell swoop the Supreme Court turned the public employee
free speech doctrine on its head. Instead of courts determining
whether speech is protected, the employer now makes the decision. If
an employer reasonably determines that an employee's speech is not
protected, then the First Amendment is not even implicated and the
employer prevails. The Court completely retreated from the position
that, for an employer to overcome the First Amendment rights of its
employees, it would have to show actual disruption. Thus, Waters
firmly established the notion that potential disruption alone is
enough to tip the balancing scales in favor of the employer. Overall,
"Waters indicates the Court's willingness to replace a genuine bal-
ancing analysis of public-employees [F]irst [A]mendment rights and
government-employer efficiency interests with an approach that de-
fers to employer decisionmaking regarding the workplace."'190
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF WATERS ON HIGHER EDUCATION
Waters severely limited the public employee free speech doctrine
by replacing a genuine balancing approach with a standard that al-
lows an employer itself to determine if speech is protected. As Justice
Scalia noted, the plurality's failure to articulate a consistent stan-
dard to guide lower courts has undoubtedly created more questions
than answers. 9 ' The confusion surrounding Waters is apparent in
the lower court opinions that have tried to decipher its meaning,19 2
and the full ramifications of the decision on academic speech remain
unclear.
One of the key questions surrounding Waters in the academic con-
text is when does it apply? Does it apply only in situations where the
content of the actual speech is in dispute? Other questions that arise
are whether a stronger showing of disruption should be required be-
fore speech is restricted and whether taking academic freedom into
account, Waters should even apply to professors.
In Jeffries v. Harlston (Jeffries 1),191 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of when Waters is applicable. 194 Leonard
Jeffries, a tenured professor and chair of the Black Studies Depart-
ment at the City University of New York, was disciplined for a con-
189. See id. at 698.
190. Edward J. Velazquez, Note, Waters v. Churchill: Government-Employer Efficiency,
Judicial Deference, and the Abandonment of Public-Employee Free Speech by the Supreme
Court, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1055, 1094 (1995).
191. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 692.
192. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994) (Jeffries I), vacated, 513
U.S. 996 (1994).
193. 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994).
194. See id.
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troversial speech he delivered off campus. 195 Jeffries' speech criticized
the racial biases he perceived in public school curricula, and during
the speech he made several comments critical of Jews. 196 Without in-
vestigating whether the speech would have an adverse impact on the
university, the university reduced his term as department chair.
9 7
The Second Circuit held that the university officials violated Jef-
fries' First Amendment rights. 198 The court based its holding on the
premise that a government employer cannot take action against an
employee for speaking on a matter of public concern unless it shows
that the speech actually "impaired the efficiency of government op-
erations."' 9  The Supreme Court decided Waters one month after Jef-
fries I and subsequently granted certiorari in Jeffries 1.200 Without
comment, the Court vacated the decision and remanded it to the Sec-
ond Circuit for reconsideration in light of Waters.2
0 1
On remand, the Second Circuit emphasized that its initial deci-
sion was based on its belief that the First Amendment protected a
public employee who speaks on matters of public concern from disci-
pline from his employer unless the speech was actually disruptive.21
2
Distinguishing Waters, the court noted that Waters held that a public
employee might be fired for disruptive speech based on the reason-
able belief of what the employee said. 213 While the content of Profes-
sor Jeffries' speech was not in dispute, the Second Circuit concluded
that it only had to apply the portion of Waters addressing the disrup-
tiveness of that speech. 0 4 Thus, in Jeffries v. Harleston (Jeffries I1),205
the Second Circuit viewed Waters as applying to all public employee
free speech cases, not just those in which the substance of the speech
is in dispute. 2 6 At least one federal court, however, has limited Wa-
ters to only those cases in which the substance of the employee's
speech is in dispute. 2
0 1
195. See id. at 1241.
196. See id. at 1242.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 1241.
199. Id. at 1245.
200. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 513 U.S. 996, 996 (1994).
201. See id.
202. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (Jeffries 11).
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995).
206. See id. at 12.
207. See Scruggs v. Keen, 900 F. Supp. 821, 829 (W.D. Va. 1995). The court stated that
"[a]t least in those cases in which the content of the employee's speech is disputed, Waters
marks a significant new approach in the law." Id. at 828. In Howze v. Virginia Polytechnic,
901 F. Supp. 1091 (W.D. Va. 1995), the same district court declined to apply Waters be-
cause the court assumed that the speech at issue was undisputed, and a Waters analysis,
therefore, was unnecessary. See id. at 1099. The district court assumed that all of the al-
leged facts were true because Howze was before the court on the university's motion to
dismiss. See id.
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Jeffries 11 also addressed whether a stronger showing of disrup-
tion should be required before speech is restricted. The court stated
that it interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Waters as necessi-
tating that the closer a public employee's speech relates to a matter
of public concern, the stronger must be the government employer's
showing of likely disruption.0 8 Nonetheless, the court found that
"even when the speech is squarely on public issues-and thus earns
the greatest constitutional protection-Waters indicates that the
government's burden is to make a substantial showing of likely inter-
ference and not an actual disruption."'2 9
The Jeffries II court construed Waters as allowing an employer to
discipline an employee for speaking on a matter of public interest
when the following is satisfied: the employer's prediction of disrup-
tion is reasonable; the potential disruptiveness is enough to outweigh
the value of the employee's speech; and the employer took action
against the employee based on this disruption and not in retaliation
for the speech.21 0 The court stated that by emphasizing that actual
disruption is not required, Waters negated the foundation of its ear-
lier opinion."
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Waters, the Jeffries II
court reversed its earlier opinion.2 12 The court found that a majority
of the defendants voted to reduce Jeffries' term as chair because it
reasonably believed that his speech would harm the university. 1 3
Based upon Waters, the court found that "as a matter of law, this po-
tential disruptiveness was enough to outweigh whatever First
Amendment value the ... speech might have had. 2 14
Thus, courts are interpreting Waters to stand for the proposition
that actual disruption is not required to overcome a public em-
ployee's free speech rights. 15 Before Waters, it was not unusual for
courts to require actual disruption.21 6 Indeed, one could argue that if
any situation required actual disruption, it would be restrictions on
the free speech rights of professors-where the Court has acknowl-
208. See Jeffries II, 52 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1995).
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 10.
213. See id. at 13-14.
214. Id. at 13.
215. The Supreme Court stated that in some instances, a public employee "may have a
strong, legitimate interest in speaking out on public matters." Waters v. Churchill, 511
U.S. 661, 674 (1994). In such instances, the Court explained, "the government may have to
make a substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive before it may
be punished." Id. (citations omitted). However, the Court did not explain what such a
showing would entail, or identify the speech that would trigger a more substantial show-
ing. See id.
216. See supra Part IV.A.
19981
212 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
edged academic freedom as a "special concern" of the First Amend-
ment. 17 Despite the Supreme Court's unequivocal language in Wa-
ters, however, at least one court has required that an employer show
actual disruption before it can overcome the free speech rights of pro-
fessors. In Burnham v. Ianni,15 the Eighth Circuit held that a uni-
versity must make a substantial showing that speech is disruptive
before the university can restrict a professor's free speech. 19
Finally, taking academic freedom into account, the Jeffries H
court addressed whether Waters applied to professors and acknowl-
edged that there was a question as to whether Waters was even ap-
plicable in the context of higher education."' The court asked
whether Jeffries, as a professor in a public university, "deserves
greater protection from state interference with his speech than did
the nurse in Waters who complained about the obstetrics division of
the hospital. '22 ' Recognizing the importance of academic freedom in
colleges and universities, the court stated that academic freedom was
an important First Amendment concern. 222 Nonetheless, the court
found that Jeffries' academic freedom had not been violated because
the function of the department chair position was ministerial.22 3
"[Tihe defendants have not sought to silence him, or otherwise limit
his access to the 'marketplace of ideas' in the classroom. 224
The Jeffries II opinion overlooks the chilling effect that the uni-
versity's actions could have on professors' speech. "Academic freedom
... extends well beyond the classroom. It is obvious that the demo-
tion was meant to, and would 'chill' both Jeffries' academic free
speech and that of others who otherwise might wish to speak out on
matters of academic policy or public affairs.12 1 Accordingly, Jeffries
H threatens to stifle professors' speech for fear of reprisal on a front
not directly related to their academic duties.
The Jeffries II decision leaves open the question of whether Wa-
ters is applicable when academic freedom rights are implicated. The
court did not address whether Waters would be applicable if a uni-
versity tried to silence a professor's classroom speech, thereby in-
fringing on his academic freedom rights. Whether a court will utilize
this opportunity to protect academic freedom remains to be seen.
217. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (declaring that academic
freedom is of transcendent value and a "special concern of the First Amendment').
218. 119 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 1997).
219. See id. at 680 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994)).
220. See Jeffries I, 52 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1995).
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 14-15 (explaining that Jeffries' academic freedom was not violated be-
cause he was still a tenured professor at the university).
224. Id.
225. Hiers, supra note 108, at 264.
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Thus, "[a]fter Waters and Jeffries II, academics might still be free to
speak out on matters of public concern; they will do so, however, only
at their own risk.122
6
VII. CHARTING A COURSE TO PROTECT ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The public employee free speech cases potentially impact every
aspect of professorial speech. Academic freedom concerns profes-
sional freedom, enjoyed in a limited, professional capacity, and not
necessarily shared with the public at large.127 The current public em-
ployee free speech doctrine is not compatible with academic freedom
and poses a serious threat to professors with minority views and un-
conventional pedagogical teachings. Prevailing wisdom could never
be overturned if new ideas are not cultivated-this is the job of a pro-
fessor. Scholars and academics continuously examine and modify the
pre-existing framework of knowledge.22 8
It follows that academic freedom is not merely the right to teach
the truth. By necessity, it encompasses the freedom to teach what is
false.229
If we had some way of being certain that some propositions were
absolute truths, perhaps we would be justified in teaching them
without bothering to inquire further about them. But we have no
such certainty. Those "truths" that were once regarded as syn-
thetic a priori truths ... have been questioned and even denied. 230
Thus, it is necessary to defend academic freedom and to restrain
those who would interfere with this right.2 31
A. The Necessity of Preserving Academic Freedom
Academic freedom insures that we do not blindly echo the beliefs
of our predecessors.2 32 "Discoveries are made, at least in part, be-
cause inquiring minds have an opportunity to challenge one another,
to debate their methods and their conclusions, and to question their
findings. 2 3 Therefore, academic freedom, both in and out of the
classroom, not only benefits the professor, but also benefits society.134
226. Id. at 265.
227. See Matthew W. Finkin, Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First
Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1332 (1988).
228. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) ("The concern of its scholars is not merely to add and revise facts in relation to an ac-
cepted framework, but to be ever examining and modifying the framework itself.")
229. See Burton M. Leiser, Threats to Academic Freedom and Tenure, 15 PACE L. REV.
15, 60 (1994).
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 59.
233. Id.
234. See id.
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If the price for voicing controversial ideas is sanction or discharge,
a university may be peaceful, but it will also be sterile.135 The result
of such an atmosphere would be self-censorship. 3 6 When university
officials are capable of disciplining a professor for his or her speech,
the chilling effect is unmistakable.2 7 When the university takes on
the role of censor, "[s]ilence is more and more often deemed
'golden.' 2 38 In these circumstances, professors will not speak out or
voice their opinion on unaccepted views.23 9 Supreme Court precedent
acknowledging academic freedom "allow[s] for the presence and tol-
erance of dissent, even when it goes against the deeply held convic-
tions of most members of the university community. 24°
The public employee free speech doctrine does not allow for such
dissent. When a professor holds a controversial view, before he will
speak out on the topic, he will have to ask himself: Am I speaking as
an employee? Is my speech on a matter of public concern? Does my
speech have the potential to disrupt university operations? The an-
swer to any of these questions could render a professor's speech com-
pletely unprotected. With such considerations in mind, a professor is
more likely "to steer clear of the forbidden zone," and will not speak
out on such issues.241
To avoid the chilling effect inherent in the public employee free
speech doctrine and the complete usurpation of academic freedom,
university officials should not be allowed to place limitations upon
the opinions a faculty member is allowed to express. Professors at in-
stitutions of higher learning should be free to express their views no
matter how outrageous, reprehensible, or condemnable they might
be. "If academic freedom means anything, it must mean that there
can be no limits to the ideas a faculty member may express, and vir-
tually none to the manner in which he expresses them .... Matters
of taste are, after all, ultimately subjective. '242
It does not require a stretch of the imagination to foresee a situa-
tion where university officials are given the power to determine the
235. See Finkin, supra note 227, at 1343.
236. See Nathan Glazer, Academic Freedom in the 1990s, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
479, 481 (1996).
237. "Difficult as the 'chilling effect' often is to document in first amendment litigation,
it is richly documented in the annals of AAUP investigations." Finkin, supra note 229, at
1343 (citing Academic Freedom and Tenure: Winthrop College, 28 AAUP BULL. 173, 190
(1942)).
238. Rita J. Simon, What Should Professors Do?, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 573, 574
(1996).
239. See Glazer, supra note 236, at 481.
240. David Rosenberg, Note, Racist Speech, The First Amendment, and Public Univer-
sities: Taking a Stand on Neutrality, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 563 (1991) (referring to
Sweezy and Keyishian).
241. Finkin, supra note 227, at 1343.
242. Leiser, supra note 229, at 62.
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manner in which a professor may express herself, which in turn
leads to the assumption of the right to determine the content of the
professor's speech.2
43
The proper way to deal with . . . faculty members who propound
heretical ideas, then, is to tolerate them, but not to ignore them.
They must be answered and exposed. But they should not be
drummed off the academic platform for expressing their ideas,
however false or despicable those ideas might be. To do so would
be inconsistent with the open and robust search for truth that is
the hallmark of science and the university. 24
4
B. A New Test for Academic Freedom
If academic freedom is to remain a special concern of the First
Amendment, as the Supreme Court recognized in Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 24 then courts should not apply Connick and Waters when
dealing with professors' speech at colleges and universities. These
cases were not decided in an academic context, but in the paternalis-
tic context of government employment and grade school educators.
Connick and Waters do not adequately take into account academic
freedom considerations. Punishing a professor for the potential dis-
ruptiveness or abstract disruptions of his speech erodes the core of
academic freedom. 4 Academic freedom is intended to protect a pro-
fessor who teaches in a controversial manner from reprisal for his
teaching methods. Connick and Waters do not offer this protection.
Pickering also fails to adequately protect a professor's interest in
academic freedom. The Scallet decision illustrates the problems asso-
ciated with applying a balancing standard to academics.2 47 The Scal-
let court had good intentions when it applied Pickering to professors'
classroom speech. Indeed, the court believed that the Pickering stan-
dard would be more protective than any other possible standard.24
However, the court overlooked some crucial factors.
The court failed to recognize that Pickering was meant to protect
an employee speaking as a citizen upon matters of public concern.2 49
When a professor is in his classroom, he is not speaking as a citizen;
rather, he is speaking in his roles as a professor, educator, and em-
ployee. Pickering could lead many courts to conclude that a profes-
243. See id.
244. Id. at 63-64.
245. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
246. See 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 19, at 165.
247. See supra Part IV.B.
248. See Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996), affd, 106 F.3d
391 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) (recognizing the "robust tradition"
of academic freedom in higher education and that the pedagogical interest in restricting
speech in an elementary school or secondary school is stronger than at the college level).
249. See id. at 1009.
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sor's classroom speech is not protected at all because the professor is
speaking in the course of his employment and merely doing his job.
Thus, the noble intent behind the Scallet court's decision to apply
Pickering to classroom speech could be circumvented.
Additionally, the current public employee doctrine does not ade-
quately account for a professor's interest in academic freedom.250 The
Eighth Circuit, however, has taken a first step in the right direction
to protect academic freedom. In Burnham, the court found that Pick-
ering was not applicable unless the employer made an initial factual
showing that the speech '"substantially' interfered with the efficiency
of the workplace."25 ' The court recognized that its decision specifi-
cally protected a professor's academic freedom.25 The Burnham deci-
sion, however, focused predominantly on the employer's burden of
showing substantial interference rather than emphasizing the inter-
ests of academic freedom in the actual balancing process. A test that
adequately preserves academic freedom would utilize the threshold
required in Burnham and apply the Supreme Court's decision in
Boos v. Barry'5 3 to professorial speech. The standard adopted in Boos
would allow a university to restrict a professor's speech based upon
its content only if the secondary effects of the speech were the targets
of the regulation. 214 However, a restriction on speech cannot focus on
the direct impact the speech has on the listener because the listener's
reaction is not a secondary effect.25 5 Regulations on speech are only
permissible when the justification for the restriction is not related to
the content of the speech. 5
6
Furthermore, what constitutes a secondary effect should be de-
termined by the nature of the workplace. An employee cannot be so
250. See supra Part IV.B.
251. See Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 668, 679 (8th Cir. 1997). The court stated that
"[t]he government employer must make a substantial showing that the speech is, in fact,
disruptive before the speech may be punished." Id. at 680. This statement seems to ignore
the mandate in Waters that the potential for disruption is enough to outweigh the free
speech interests of a public employee.
252. See id. at 680 n.19. The court stated that underlying its decision was "the recogni-
tion of the professors' academic freedom -'a special concern of the First Amendment."' Id.
(quoting University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).
253. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
254. See id. at 320. Content-based regulations on speech are generally impermissible.
However, a restriction may be categorized as content neutral if the target of the regulation
is not the content of the speech but the secondary effects that the speech produces. See id.
[S]econdary effects... refer[ ] to regulations that apply to a particular category
of speech because the regulatory targets happen to be associated with that type
of speech. So long as the justifications for regulation have nothing to do with
content, i.e., the desire to suppress crime has nothing to do with the actual
films being shown inside adult movie theaters, we concluded that the regula-
tion was properly analyzed as content neutral.
Id.
255. See id. at 321.
256. See id. at 320-21.
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offended by speech that he or she is effectively excluded from the
workplace. A secondary effect must be gauged by the expectations of
the employee given the nature of the job and what an employee le-
gitimately expects to encounter while at work.117 Those in academia
should legitimately expect to be confronted with controversial and
unpopular views from their colleagues. Academic freedom embraces
the notion that dissent will be tolerated even when it offends the
convictions of most of the university community.15
Applying the Boos standard rather than the current public em-
ployee doctrine in academic contexts is necessary because of the spe-
cial considerations inherent in academic freedom. Thus, requiring a
university to show substantial disruption before it restricts speech
and only allowing the restriction if it was aimed at the secondary ef-
fects of the speech allows a professor the freedom to express contro-
versial views and safeguards academic freedom. Such a test does jus-
tice to a professor's interest in academic freedom while still allowing
a university to control its operations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As Justice Louis L. Brandeis once noted, "Sunlight is said to be
the best disinfectant. '2 9 This is the strength of academic freedom:
truth will eventually emerge if people have the freedom to express
their views, examine and criticize these views, and ultimately expose
false views. However, if such expression is stifled, majoritarian views
will predominate, critical inquiry will cease, and our society will
stagnate. The extremely restrictive public employee speech doctrine
promulgated by the Supreme Court poses a serious threat to aca-
demic freedom. The protection of academic freedom is not only a
paramount concern for professors, but for society as a whole. The
public employee doctrine needs to be reexamined so that it encom-
passes protection for academic freedom-a virtue the Supreme Court
itself once described as of "transcendent value to all of us."26 0
257. For example, a clerk of court may have to look at evidence in an obscenity case.
This speech may offend the clerk and, in other work contexts, could create legitimate sec-
ondary effects that could be regulated. However, the secondary effects must be gauged by
the nature of the job. A clerk legitimately expects to be exposed to this kind of material
during an obscenity case. Thus, based on the expectations of the clerk, the speech would
not produce any secondary effects capable of regulation.
258. See Rosenberg, supra note 240, at 563.
259. Louis L. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at
10, cited in Federal Election Comm'n v. Political Contribution Data, Inc., 943 F.2d 190, 191
(2d Cir. 1991).
260. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
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